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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REJECTS
"SWEAT EQUITY": NOR WEST BANK
WORTHINGTON v. AHLERS
Patrick W. Fischer*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Financial crisis" and "farming" have become nearly synonymous
during the past five years as many farmers have been forced into bank-
ruptcy.1 The two factors contributing most to the decline in the financial
strength of farming were the amount of debt that farmers carried at high
interest rates2 and the sharp decline in farm exports.3 During the middle
and late 1970's, the government encouraged farmers to plant fence-to-
fence to feed the world. American farmers exported tons of food daily.4
* B.A. 1983, College of St. Thomas; J.D., 1987 William Mitchell College of Law. The author
is currently working on an LL.M. in taxation at William Mitchell College of Law while working for
Arkell Development Corporation. The author expresses his gratitude to Rachel Riensche for her
excellent help in preparing this article.
1. See generally, Fischer, Sweat Equity: In re Ahlers, 23 TULSA L.J. 37, 37-38 (1987).
2. Heffernan, Agricultural Letter Number 1711, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, (July 3,
1987). In the Seventh Federal Reserve District, the number of farmers that had debt on their farms
increased from 42% to 63%. This jump occurred particularly from 1974-1979. Id. Along with the
increase in the number of farmers with debt came a doubling in the amount of debt that the farmers
carried. Id.
3. Id.
4. Brief for Respondents at 11, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988)
(No. 86-958).
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In 19821 the bubble burst as exports declined sharply6 while farm pro-
duction expenses and interest rates soared higher.7 The plight of the
farmer was similar throughout the country: financial trouble. Many
farmers were forced into Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to sal-
vage their farms and their livelihoods. However, further trouble awaited
the farmer in bankruptcy because the Bankruptcy Code was not designed
to deal with problems unique to farming.
One of those problems was the interpretation of the Absolute Prior-
ity Rule, Section 1129(b)(1).' This section governs how a reorganization
plan should be approved by the debtors and when a court can overrule
the debtors' plan. The Supreme Court put this dispute to rest in Norwest
'Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,9 a farm bankruptcy case in litigation for
four years.1" The Court overruled the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision that allowed the Ahlers to retain an ownership interest in the
reorganized farm plan by contributing labor, experience, and expertise. 1I
In rejecting the "sweat equity" theory, the Supreme Court also consid-
ered for the first time the "no value theory."' 2
II. THE AHLERS DECISION
A. Facts
James and Mary Ahlers farmed 840 acres near Worthington, Min-
nesota.13 During the early 1980's, they expanded their farming opera-
tions by purchasing both land and equipment. 4 They financed these
acquisitions by using their farmland, crops, livestock, machinery, and
5. During the 1970's, farm land increased in value almost four-fold allowing farmers to bor-
row more money to expand their operations. This worked fine until 1982 when interest rates were
high while farm income dropped dramatically as farm exports decreased. See Heffernan, supra note
2. See generally Wall Street Journal Review and Outlook (Aug. 26, 1985); Brief for the State of
Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Texas at 1, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S.
Ct. 963 (1988)(No. 86-958).
6. See Brief, supra note 4 at 10, 11.
7. See Heffernan, supra note 2. Production expenses were up 54% while interest expenses
increased by more than 150% from the 1974 level. Id.
8. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
9. 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
10. See Brief for Petitioner at 3-11, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988)
(No. 86-958), for a history of the case and how the different courts have decided this case.
11. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
12. This argument was initiated in an amicus brief submitted by the Solicitor General.
13. Ahlers, 794 F.2d, at 392. The Ahlers owned 560 acres and rented 280 acres of land in
Nobles County. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 24:155
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farm proceeds as collateral.15 Most of the financing was provided by two
major sources. 16 The Federal Land Bank ("FLB") had a first mortgage
on the farmland,17 and Norwest Bank of Worthington ("Norwest") had
a second mortgage on the farmland and farm proceeds as well as a first
mortgage on almost all of the Ahlers' farm equipment.18
In 1983 and 1984, the decline in crop prices and inclement weather
caused a drastic decrease in the Ahlers' farm revenues.19 This decrease
in revenues forced the Ahlers to default on their interest payments to
Norwest Bank. On November 16, 1984, Norwest initiated a replevin ac-
tion to gain possession of the collateralized farm equipment. 20 The re-
plevin action was halted two weeks later when the Ahlers obtained an
automatic stay21 by filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization
petition.22
Norwest Bank subsequently filed for relief from the automatic stay
and sought adequate protection.23 The bankruptcy court found Norwest
undersecured due to dropping values in farm machinery and land, enti-
tling it to adequate protection compensation.24 The Ahlers fought this
ruling, and numerous motions and proceedings followed.25 The case fi-
nally went to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled on the
compensation issue as well as other bankruptcy issues in the case on July
2, 1986.26
15. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
16. The Ahlers were indebted to three other creditors for a total amount of $42,028. These
debts were secured by a combine ($35,791), storage bin ($3337), and an automobile ($2,900). Ahlers,
794 F.2d at 392.
17. The Federal Land Bank was owed $524,854 on four parcels of land. The financing for these
acquisitions began in 1965. The last purchase was made in 1982. Id.
18. Norwest Bank was owed approximately $450,000 when the original suit was brought. Id.
19. There was also a drastic drop in the value of land and farm machinery at this time.
20. The petition was filed in Minnesota State Court under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 565.23 (West
Cum. Supp. 1985). In Re Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 392-93.
21. Id. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code governs automatic stays. For a detailed analysis of
automatic stays. See Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Laws, 1980 ANN. SURV.
OF BANKR. L. 23 (1980).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This section explains how a reorganization
will occur and the rules governing it.
23. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. The Federal Land Bank also joined Norwest in this petition. Id.
24. Id. The bankruptcy court stated that Norwest was "entitled to compensation as adequate
protection for the delay of enforcing contractual repossession and foreclosure rights during the in-
terim between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the plan. It is the present value of that
interest, the opportunity lost, that must be protected." Id. (citation omitted).
25. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393, which discusses most of the legal proceedings in which these
two opponents were involved.
26. Id. The Eighth Circuit had previously made a decision on the automatic stay and also on
the feasibility of a reorganization plan, and sent it back to the State District Court before this appeal
was decided. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit had ruled and remanded the case to the Minne-
sota district court, but the lower court did not follow the Eighth Circuit's
instructions.27 The court of appeals ruled that Norwest Bank should not
be given relief from the automatic stay2 8 and that a feasible reorganiza-
tion plan could be made.29 There were many issues that the court ex-
amined to determine how the automatic stay should be handled,30 but
the final decision was based upon Minnesota laws that governed the case.
The court also held that a feasible reorganization plan could be
made for the Ahlers' farm.31 The court rejected Norwest's and FLB's
contention that the Bankruptcy Code's absolute priority rule must be fol-
lowed. The rule, which was adopted by Section 1129(b)(2)(B), 3 2 provides
that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be replenished before
any junior class can retain or receive any property under the plan.33
27. Id.
28. See Fischer, supra note 1 at 60-68, for an in-depth and complete discussion of the court's
decision and the issues it faced.
29. See Comment, Bankruptcy-Chapter 11 Reorganization-Determining the Starting Date of
Adequate Protection Payments for Opportunity Cost and Expanding the Contribution Exception to the
Absolute Priority Rule, 63 N.D.L. Rav. 405, 408-09 (1987).
30. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395-97.
31. Id. at 396-97.
32. Id. at 401. The Eighth Circuit gives a very detailed analysis on the creation of the absolute
priority rule.
33. Section 1129 states in pertinent part:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the applicable requirements of
subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the
court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the
requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted, the plan.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims,
whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to an-
other entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to
attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under
clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such
claims.
(B) With .respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain
on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to
the allowed amount of such claims; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class
4
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However, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. 34 the United States
Supreme Court modified the rule to allow a junior creditor to participate
in the reorganization plan and receive an equity interest if the junior
creditor contributed "money or money's worth" to the reorganization
plan.35 The Eighth Circuit used the "money's worth" language to con-
clude that the Ahlers' contribution to the plan could be the "labor, expe-
rience and expertise" from their work on the farm.36 These contributions
effectuated approval of the plan over the objections of the creditors. The
Ahlers' expertise was needed to make the farm profitable. Furthermore,
the liquidated value of the assets would be less than the reorganization
plan, which kept the farm operating.37
B. Supreme Court Decision
On appeal from the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court delineated
proper application of the "absolute priority rule."' 38 The Court began its
analysis by defining the rule and examining the legislative and case law
history. The absolute priority rule "provides that a dissenting class of
unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior class
can receive or retain any property under a reorganization plan."3 9 The
rule's origin is in the judicial construction of the underlying bankruptcy
statute requirement that a plan be "fair and equitable."'  This judicial
rule was finally codified in Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978.41
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any
property.
(C) With respect to a class of interests-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive or
retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which
such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is entitled, or the
value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401, for a discussion of the
development of 1129(b)(1) and the significance of Northern Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
34. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). In this case, the old shareholders were allowed to put capital into the
reorganization and keep an equity interest in the reorganized business.
35. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401.
36. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963, 967 (1988).
37. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402. See also Fischer, supra note 1, at 66-67.
38. See Norwest Bank, 108 S. Ct. at 966-68.
39. Id. at 966 (quoting Ahlers 794 F.2d at 401).
40. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville New Albany & Chicago Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684
(1899).
41. See also B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 8.03 (1986).
1988]
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The Supreme Court observed that the statutes do not allow a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization plan to be confirmed over the creditor's legitimate
objections,42 and that the reorganization plan left the Ahlers with an eq-
uity interest in their farm that was contrary to the absolute priority
rule.4 3 The court of appeals did not disagree, but instead had found an
exception under Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.: An equity
interest can be given if the debtor makes a contribution of "money or
money's worth."'  The Supreme Court disagreed with that court's char-
acterization of the Ahlers' labor, experience, and expertise in running the
farm as constituting "money's worth." It would be very difficult to value
and measure the Ahlers' contribution in order to fit into the Los Angeles
Lumber exception.45
Next, the Court considered the Congressional history behind the
adoption of the absolute priority rule. In the Los Angeles Lumber case,
existing shareholders pledged "'their financial standing and influence in
the community' and their 'continuity of management' to the reorganized
enterprise."46 The Court found that this was not "money's worth" but
merely vague hopes or possibilities. A balance sheet does not provide for
this type of contribution, and the Ahlers' promise of service to the farm
would be unenforceable if they decided not to perform their services on
the farm.47 To be the equivalent of money's worth, the contribution
must be of value to the creditors today, not some hope of possible service
or value in the future.48 The Supreme Court compared the promises
made by the Ahlers with those made in Los Angeles Lumber and con-
cluded that neither were tantamount to "money's worth." This type of
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
43. Norwest Bank, 108 S. Ct. at 966.
44. Id.
45. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals never stated how the value of a farmer's labor, experi-
ence, and expertise should be measured but only that it would be easy to make this determination.
In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d, 388, 402 (8th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court described the impact of this
decision on the Los Angeles Lumber case:
Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any comment on the continuing vitality of
the Los Angeles Lumber exception-a question which has divided the lower courts since
passage of the Code in 1978. Compare, e.g., In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc., 72 B.R. 454,
456, and n. 1 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD 111. 1987) with, eg., In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co.,
19 B.R. 819, 833 (Bkrtey. Ct. SDNY 1982). Rather, we simply conclude that even if an
"infusion-of-'money-or money's-worth'" exception to the absolute priority rule has sur-
vived the enactment of § 1129(b), respondents' proposed contribution to the reorganization
plan is inadequate to gain the benefit of this exception.
Norwest Bank, 108 S. Ct. at 967 n.3.
46. Id. at 967.
47. Id. No other court of appeals decision has allowed labor, experience, and expertise to fit
into the Los Angeles Lumber exception. Id.
48. Id. at 967-68.
[Vol. 24:155
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contribution was not intended "to escape the absolute priority rule."4 9
The Court then looked at the legislative history behind the absolute
priority rule to determine if the Ahlers' management contribution fit into
a proposed broader exception of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy
Commission submitted a proposal to modify the absolute priority rule
and thus permit equity-holders to participate in a reorganized enterprise
based on a contribution of" 'continued management.., essential to the
business' or other participation beyond 'money or money's worth.' "50
Congress rejected this view and instead adopted the current Section
1129(b)(2)(B). The Supreme Court considered Congress' rejection of the
view that there was no general exception to the absolute priority rule,
thus there was no congressional basis for the Ahiers' suggestion.51
The second argument advanced by the respondent was equitable in
nature. Since the nature of a bankruptcy proceeding is in equity, the
Alders proposed that it was inequitable for the class of unsecured credi-
tors to reject the reorganization plan. 2 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, stating that even though a bankruptcy court has equitable
powers, its rulings can be made only within the "confines" of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."3 The Code requires the bankruptcy plan to be fair and
equitable, and it allows creditors an opportunity to vote on the plan and
withhold approval if it does not protect them adequately." Although
creditors might be better off by approving the plan, courts are not enti-
tled to make such decisions.
The third theory advanced by Ahlers provided that the absolute pri-
ority rule was inapposite. The basis advanced for inapplicability was that
the Ahlers sought to retain a property interest with no value to the senior
unsecured creditors, and therefore of no concern to those creditors.5
The Ahlers argued that the "farm has no 'going concern' value (apart
from their own labor on it), any equity interest they retain in a reorgniza-
tion of the farm is worthless, and therefore is not property' under 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) ...."56
49. Id. at 968.
50. Id. This proposal received considerable criticism. See Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commis-
sion's Proposed 'Modifications' of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANxR. L.J. 305 (1974).
51. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963, 968 (1988).
52. Id. In order for a plan to be fair and equitable, it must take into consideration the best
interests of all parties involved. Id.
53. Id. at 968-69.
54. Id. at 969. The Code gives approval authority to the creditors, not the courts. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
1988]
7
Fischer: United States Supreme Court Rejects Sweat Equity: Norwest Bank Wo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
This argument is called the "no value" theory and has been over-
whelmingly rejected by a majority of jurisdictions as well as the Supreme
Court.57 The term "property" has been given a broad definition by both
case law and legislative history. Even when debts exceed the current
value of assets, a debtor who receives an equity interest in the business
has received or retained a property interest." After first determining
that the definition of property would include the Ahlers' interest, the
Court concluded that the "no value theory" was inappropriate in this
case.59 The Ahlers' interest was property under Section 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
and could be retained only if the reorganization plan were accepted by
the creditors "or formulated in compliance with the absolute priority
rule.,,6
o
In conclusion, the Court acknowledged the seriousness of the farm
situation but declined to address the problem. Because Congress has
tried to respond to the difficulties farmers face in reorganizing the debt
on their farms with the recent enactment of Chapter 12, the Court would
not interfere.61
III. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision on the absolute priority rule and the Los
Angeles Lumber case were the only logical conclusions that it could
reach. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals never argued that the
Ahlers could escape the absolute priority rule; instead, it maintained that
Los Angeles Lumber created an exception to the rule.62 This analysis is
clearly erroneous. The Los Angeles Lumber decision provided:
[Tihey [management skills, financial standing and influence in the
community] cannot possibly be translated into money's worth reason-
ably equivalent to the participation accorded the old stockholders.
They have no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new
company. They reflect merely vague hopes or possibilities. As such,
57. Id. Apparently, only one case has accepted this theory in a case similar to this one. See In
re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 Bankr. 983, 988-89 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986). Cases rejecting the
theory are: In re Modem Glass Specialists, Inc., 42 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984); In re
Huckabee Auto Co., 33 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981); In re Landau Boat Co., 8 Bankr. 436
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). Id. at 969 n.6.
58. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963, 969 (1988). It does not matter
whether the value is present or prospective. For purposes of control or to receive dividends, it is still
property. Id.
59. Id. at 970. The Eighth Circuit stated the Ahlers would be able to share in the profits. If
that is the case, then there certainly is value and, therefore, a property interest. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 970-71.
62. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:155
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they cannot be the basis for issuance of stock to otherwise valueless
interests.
63
While the argument could be made that the Ahlers' contribution of
labor, experience, and expertise could be ascertained more easily than the
contributions offered by the debtors in Los Angeles Lumber, it is still
inadequate for purposes of the "money's worth" exception. Further, the
senior creditors could not sell the Ahlers' contribution or force them to
continue to work the farm. Thus, the Ablers' contribution is "intangible,
inalienable, and, in all likelihood, unenforceable." 64
The Ahers attempted to argue their case around the "money's
worth" dicta, which required a tangible asset of a defined value to be
contributed in order to get an equity position in the reorganized business.
The Court seems to have required that the debtor offer a cash substitute
and summarized, "There is no way to distinguish between the promises
[the Ahlers] proffer[ed] here and those of the shareholders in Los Angeles
Lumber; neither is an adequate contribution to escape the absolute prior-
ity rule.",65
The Ahlers also argued that there is an overall broad exception to
the absolute priority rule. However, the legislative history does not sup-
port such an argument. There was a proposal before Congress to allow
former equity holders or shareholders to participate in the reorganized
business for their management and labor skills to be codified in the Code,
but this met with such opposition that it was rejected.66 Since the propo-
sal was rejected, it was illogical to argue that a broader exception existed
beyond this argument or the Los Angeles Lumber case.
Finally, the "no value" argument has no place in this case. Appar-
ently, only one court67 has accepted the theory, while the majority has
63. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122-23 (1939) (footnote omitted).
64. Norwest Bank, 108 S. Ct. at 967.
65. Id. at 967-68.
66. Brief for Petitioners at 16-17, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963
(1988)(No 86-958). The petitioners maintained that
[o]ne of the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals to Congress was to modify the Absolute
Priority Rule and reject Los Angeles Lumber. See Report of the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doe. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 254-259 (1973).
The Bankruptcy Commission endorsed participation in the reorganized debtor by former
shareholders or equity interest holders in exchange for their management skill and labor.
Id. at 258-59. After extensive hearings and debate, the proposed modification was rejected
by Congress and the Absolute Priority Rule was codified at Section 1129(b)(2). The legis-
lative history makes it clear that to confirm a plan over the dissent of a class of unsecured
claims, "they must be paid in full or, if paid less than in full, then no class junior may
receive anything under the plan ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. See In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 Bankr. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
1988]
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rejected the theory that the equity interest is not a "property" interest.68
If the Ahlers were allowed to retain an interest, that interest should
surely be construed as property under section 1129(b). While the Code
itself does not define property, the legislative history gives the word a
broad meaning: "'[P]roperty' includes both tangible and intangible
property."69 The Ahlers would receive an interest in a reorganized busi-
ness that could yield them a profit if the property were sold for a price
above that which is owed the creditors. This may be a speculative future
gain, yet it represents the possibility of profit and thus a "property" inter-
est. The Court correctly observed that if there is no property or value at
stake, then there would have been no motivation for over three years of
litigation.70
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court finally put to rest the novel idea that experience,
expertise, and labor could be used to allow the debtor to acquire an eq-
uity interest in the reorganized business. The Supreme Court seemed to
be saying that the Code stands as is, and that any changes will have to be
made by Congress. Had the Supreme Court affirmed the Ahlers case, it
would have made a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization much more
attractive for farmers than the recently enacted Chapter 12. The result,
however, would have been aid to farmers beyond Congress' intention.
68. See supra note 57.
69. Norwest Bank, 108 S. Ct. at 969 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 970.
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss1/7
